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Justice Blackmun's papers were opened to the public on March 4, 2004,
the fifth anniversary of his death. Held in the Manuscript Division of the Li-
brary of Congress, the collection includes over half a million items, many
handwritten by Justice Blackmun. Anyone can read them. For legal scholars,
this kind of research can only be described as exhilarating and many of the
articles in this symposium draw on research from Justice Blackmun's papers.
For the public, the release comes at a time when the interest in judges is par-
ticularly acute.
As researchers gained access to the Blackmun Papers, discussions about
the nature of judging have reached a fever pitch in the United States. The
issue was a significant theme in the 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns
l
and even more so during the recent confirmation process of Chief Justice
John Roberts to the Supreme Court along with the nomination of Judge Sam-
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1. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Election at the Crossroads: Supreme Court: Aging
judiciary heralds historic transformation, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2004, at Al (avail-
able at 2004 WLNR 7627206); Jim Puzzanghera, Political maneuvering may exert
big influence on the highest court, and American lives, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Nov. 6 2005, at 1 (available at 2005 WLNR 17938165).
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uel Alito and the failed nomination of Harriet Miers.2 As Congress, the me-
dia, and legal scholars debated the wisdom and merits of the nominees, much
of their discussion centered on what makes a good (or bad) judge and how
particular nominees would perform in that role.3 Such debates have also
dominated the appointment of judges to the lower federal courts for years. As
many of the symposium contributors reveal, Justice Blackmun's own judicial
legacy is hotly debated.
These debates expose a dilemma: We want to know (or to be able to pre-
dict) how judges will decide cases we care about. We want to know what
shapes a judge's approach to a case. Thus, judicial nominees in confirmation
hearings are asked about their judicial philosophies and their views of current
issues or past decisions. But we also insist that judges decide cases according to
law, putting aside the personal convictions that were probed during the confir-
mation process. Once confirmed, judges can retreat behind the court's mantle
of secrecy. Even the most astute reader of opinions can have a hard time piec-
ing together after the fact what made a judge vote or write as she did, why a
judge changed her mind on an issue, or what moved the court in one direction
or another. Enormously controversial decisions, such as Roe v. Wade4 or Bush
v. Gore,5 arouse skepticism that judging is anything more than raw politics.6
The Blackmun Papers reveal this dilemma in operation. Because the Pa-
pers are unusually extensive and because many of the members of the present
Supreme Court served with Justice Blackmun, the Papers reveal much about
the current Court. Not surprisingly, the release of the Papers was quite con-
troversial. And that controversy seems to turn, in part, on disagreements
about how much we should know about what goes on at the Court, an institu-
tion long shrouded in secrecy and confidentiality.
Some students of the Court argue that the release of the Papers is a posi-
tive step. Harold Koh, Dean of the Yale Law School and a former Blackmun
clerk, for example, notes that the Papers provide an "authoritative archive of
2. J. Scott Orr, Trying to judge the mind of Alito, Questions to probe Supreme
Court pick, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), Nov. 4, 2005, at 1 (available at 2005 WLNR
17860522).
3. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Panel Approves Roberts, 13-5, As 3 of 8 De-
mocrats Back Him, N.Y. TIMES, Sept., 23, 2005, at Al; Matt Stearns, "The type of
nominee I've been asking for ", K.C. STAR, Nov. 9, 2005, at A3; John H. Reese, Ques-
tions for high court nominee, DENVER POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at El.
4. 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Vincent Bugliosi, None Dare Call It Treason, THE NATION, Feb. 5,
2001 (characterizing the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore as having "committed the
unpardonable sin of being a knowing surrogate for the Republican Party instead of
being an impartial arbiter of the law") (available at http://www.thenation.com/
doc/20010205/bugliosi); Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, June 29, 1989, at 53 (arguing that Court's abortion decisions engender a
"cynical view ... that constitutional law is only a matter of which president appointed
the last few justices").
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the Supreme Court for the last quarter of the 2 0'h century," from which one
"can recreate the story of any case." 7 Moreover, according to Dean Koh, this
"archive" allows us to see, through the perspective of a "very modest and
very observant person" how the "most important social issues of our day"
played out.8 This is a tantalizing opportunity, given that we usually have only
the final opinions and the papers filed with the Court with which to work. In a
similar vein, Professor Pamela Karlan, also a former Blackmun clerk, be-
lieves that the Papers will build public "confidence about how carefully the
Court thinks about things before it issues a decision."9 On the other hand,
Professor John Yoo, former clerk to Justice Thomas, sees a danger in the
possible use of the Papers to predict Justices' votes in future cases.10 Profes-
sor Yoo notes that "it's the opinion itself [] which is the law, not the sort of
judicial legislative history about how the court got there."' 1 I
The Blackmun Papers offer us a new window into how judges and courts
work. Ordinarily, our understanding of Supreme Court decisions is shaped
largely by the Court's written opinion, which tends to justify and legitimize the
decision and usually presents the result as inevitable. To be sure, concurring
and dissenting opinions, along with the written briefs and oral arguments of
counsel, somewhat counteract this aura of inevitability. But the Blackmun Pa-
pers, which include Justice Blackmun's notes from oral argument and confer-
ence, give us much more. The conference notes indicate which way each Jus-
tice initially voted, making it possible to trace vote changes. The collection also
includes draft opinions, memoranda between Justices discussing changes to the
wording of opinions, negotiations about joining opinions, and even memoranda
between Justice Blackmun and his clerks regarding strategies to persuade other
Justices to join opinions. In contrast to the finality of the Court's official written
opinion, these documents illustrate how the result came to be. Noted historian
David McCullough is fond of saying that history need not have turned out the
way it did.' 2 The Blackmun Papers remind us that the same is true of the
Court's decisions or, indeed, of many court decisions. That fact is the genesis of
this Symposium, which is an occasion to think about judging and the many
influences on judicial decision making.
7. "The Blackmun Tapes," broadcast March 4, 2004, available at
http://www.npr.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june04/blackmun_3-04.htm, at p. 2 (copy
of transcript on file with author].
8. Id.
9. "The Blackmun Tapes," broadcast March 5, 2004, available at
http://www.npr.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june4/blackmun_03-05.html, at 2 [copy of
transcript on file with author].
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id.
12. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, BRAVE COMPANIONS xiv (1992) ("It is of the utmost
importance, I believe, to convey the sense that things need not have happened as they
did.").
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Participants in this Symposium explore judging from many angles, includ-
ing law, journalism, political science and psychology. In her keynote speech
and lead article, Politics and Judgment, Professor Suzanna Sherry argues that
the current hostility to judicial review arises from our increasing acceptance of
the view that judges deciding constitutional cases engage in "politics by another
name." 13 She maintains that the conflation of law and politics is both wrong
and dangerous because, although it has not yet done so, it has the potential to
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. After exploring the many influences combin-
ing to create the impression of "law as politics," Professor Sherry suggests that
judges do not act politically but rather must unavoidably exercise judgment in
constitutional decision making. She concludes by discussing existing con-
straints on such judgment and suggesting additional constraints to "encourage
judges to rely more on judgment and less on politics."' 14
Three of our panelists, The Honorable Duane Benton of the Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals, The Honorable Colleen McMahon of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, and reporter Tony Mauro of
the Legal Times, provide a real world view of judging. Judge Colleen McMa-
hon eloquently discusses the life of a district court judge.' 5 As she explains,
unlike appellate judges or Supreme Court Justices, lower court judges act inde-
pendently, obviating the need to lobby for votes or discuss draft opinions with
colleagues. Such monasticism, however, requires a certain amount of self-
awareness, which she defines as (1) the knowledge of who one is as a person,
including what one values and what motivates one's decisions, and (2) the abil-
ity to be honest with oneself. Such self-awareness is particularly necessary in
district judges because they serve as the final decision maker in far more cases
than superior court judges. She further argues that, contrary to conventional
wisdom regarding "activist judges," district court judges readily come to under-
stand the need for self-awareness as they settle into their jobs.
Judge Duane Benton writes of the Blackmun Papers and what they reveal
regarding the relationship between Justice Blackmun and fellow Supreme
Court Justice Warren Burger.' 6 Tracking the relationship between Justices
Blackmun and Burger from their childhood together to their time on the Court,
Judge Benton discusses the public perception and private reality of the relation-
ship between the two men, including the apparent growing rift as the two sepa-
rated along ideological lines during their years as Justices. He concludes with a
discussion of "collegiality," its role in judicial decision making and how the
Blackmun-Burger relationship fits within the definition of that term.
13. Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment, 70 Mo. L. REv. 973, 975 (2005).
14. Id. at 986.
15. Colleen McMahon, The Monastic Life of a Federal District Judge, 70 MO. L.
REv. 989 (2005).
16. Duane Benton & Barrett J. Vahle, The Burger-Blackmun Relationship: Les-
sons for Collegiality from the Blackmun Papers, 70 Mo. L. REV. 995 (2005).
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In his essay, Tony Mauro considers the significance of the Blackmun Pa-
pers for what they reveal about the more human side of the Justices.' 7 The Pa-
pers, he argues, lift the veil of secrecy behind which the Court often hides and
allow the public a seldom seen glimpse of the Justices' informal actions. Mauro
then recounts a fascinating series of vignettes revealed by the Papers, ranging
from Blackmun's highly descriptive note-taking proclivities during oral argu-
ments to the politics arising between various chambers as opinions were
drafted. As Mauro notes, while such vignettes seem personal in nature, they add
much to our understanding of the Court's operation and Justice Blackmun's
role within it.
Three of our panelists, Professors Greg Sisk, Joseph Kobylka and Ellen
Deason, discuss Justice Blackmun's legacy or, more generally, the legacy of
the Blackmun Papers. Professor Sisk examines Justice Blackmun's legacy by
grappling with his judicial style.' 8 Although he acknowledges those who tout
Blackmun as the "conscience" of the court, Professor Sisk argues that such
praise misconceives the judicial role. Examining Justice Blackmun's decisions
in abortion, religious liberty and death penalty cases, Professor Sisk concludes
that "Justice Blackmun's opinions on the central constitutional controversies of
our time are better described as acts of will than as acts of conscience."19 Such
decision making, he argues, is inconsistent with judges' obligation to adhere to
the rule of law.
Professor Kobylka's article, on the other hand, re-examines conventional
wisdom regarding Justice Blackmun's career, arguing that the focus on Roe v.
Wade as his primary legacy is misguided. 20 As Professor Kobylka maintains,
Justice Blackmun's abortion jurisprudence was hampered by a variety of per-
sonal, political and institutional factors that affected his much criticized major-
ity opinion in Roe and weakened both its influence and his influence in later
abortion cases. In contrast, Professor Kobylka argues, Justice Blackmun's last-
ing contribution came in a more coherent privacy jurisprudence that began,
unhampered by the distractions and limitations of the abortion cases, in his
dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick2' and ultimately triumphed in its adoption by the
22 2majorities in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas. 3
Professor Deason utilizes the Blackmun Papers to examine the evolution
of the Court's arbitrability cases. Discussing the Court's progression from hos-
tility toward to acceptance of arbitration in a wide variety of cases, Professor
17. Tony Mauro, Lifting the Veil: Justice Blackmun's Papers and the Public
Perception of the Supreme Court, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1037 (2005).
18. Gregory C. Sisk, The Willful Judging of Harry Blackmun, 70 Mo. L. REv.
1049 (2005).
19. Id. at 1050.
20. Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales from the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation
of Harry Blackmun 's Judicial Legacy, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1075 (2005)
21. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
22. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
23. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2005]
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Deason notes that upon superficial examination one "might view the arbitrabil-
ity cases as an inexorable progression in which the Court purposefully created
the legal conditions for business interests to move major categories of cases
from the courts to arbitration."24 Relying on information revealed in the
Blackmun Papers, however, she argues that the cases were "often a product of
narrow and shifting majorities,, 25 and concludes that a variety of factors influ-
enced the decisions, ranging from policy implications, to attitudes toward arbi-
tration, to institutional effects of the Court as a multi-membered body.
Professor Martha Dragich Pearson's commentary draws upon themes
raised in the above articles to illuminate Justice Blackmun's death penalty
jurisprudence. 26 Noting Professors Sisk's and Kobylka's observations regard-
ing characteristics present in other areas of Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence,
such as abortion rights and religious liberties cases, Professor Dragich Pear-
son deftly weaves together evidence from the Blackmun Papers and Justice
Blackmun's opinions to explain the evolution of his thinking in death penalty
cases. In his brief commentary, Professor Richard Reuben describes Justice
Blackmun as a "champion of the unprivileged" who was nevertheless aware
of his potential for error and the need for humility in decision making.27 He
contrasts this view with those of other symposium participants, such as Pro-
fessors Sisk and Deason, comparing the Blackmun Papers' influence on the
formation of their opinions of Justice Blackmun's jurisprudential approach.
Our final three panelists, Professors Theodore Ruger, Daniel Farber, and
Lawrence Wrightsman, discuss judging through various legal, social or po-
litical science lenses. Professor Ruger examines the phenomenon of judicial
preference change - i.e., a judge's jurisprudential shift over time. Using
Justice Blackmun as an example, Professor Ruger explains that "[a]lthough
the extent of [his] preference shift was unusual ... an emerging body of em-
pirical research suggests that many long-serving Supreme Court Justices ex-
perience significant preference change during their tenure. ''29 Exploring the
empirical literature on judicial preference change, Professor Ruger analyzes
its implications for various theoretical models of judicial behavior and raises
questions for future research.
24. Ellen E. Deason, Perspectives on Decisionmaking from the Blackmun Pa-
pers: The Cases on Arbitrability of Statutory Claims, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1133, 1138
(2005).
25. Id. at 1138.
26. Martha Dragich Pearson, Revelations from the Blackmun Papers on the De-
velopment of Death Penalty Law, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1183 (2005).
27. Richard C. Reuben, Justice Blackmun and the Spirit of Liberty, 70 Mo. L.
REv. 1199, 1201 (2005).
28. Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judi-
cial Preference Change, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1209 (2005).
29. Id. at 1210.
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Professor Farber explores the longstanding issue of the legitimacy of Su-
preme Court constitutional decisions.30 Asking "what is required to ground a
constitutional ruling," Professor Farber argues that a result is not illegitimate
simply because it is wrong; rather we must be able to say a decision is wholly
unreasonable before we can consider it an illegitimate exercise of power.
31
Drawing on the "arbitrary and capricious" test from administrative law, Profes-
sor Farber discusses the factors relevant to the consideration of whether a judi-
cial opinion is reasonable and concludes his article with an application of his
test to Justice Blackmun's most famous opinion, Roe v. Wade.
Professor Wrightsman's article seeks to answer the question of why Su-
32preme Court Justices succeed or fail. The article develops a definition of
judicial effectiveness based upon a Justice's ability (1) to influence his or her
colleagues personally and (2) to have their views "reflected in the corpus of
decisions by the Court." 33 Professor Wrightsman then applies this definition
to Justice Blackmun, identifying various characteristics that might have influ-
enced his effectiveness, and concluding that Justice Blackmun was not terri-
bly effective within the Court but that certain portions of society hold his
jurisprudential style in high regard.
Professor Margaret McGuinness's commentary focuses on Justice
Blackmun's internationalism, an often overlooked aspect of his jurispru-
dence. 34 Her essay reviews several of the Court's cases involving interna-
tional questions, which she uses to reveal Justice Blackmun's internationalist
perspective and further discusses how this perspective influenced Justice
Blackmun's death penalty decisions, a subject that was the focus of many of
the symposium contributors' articles. Noting a consistent theme throughout
the symposium regarding the many different influences on judicial decision-
making, Professor Christina Wells's comment suggests that the prevailing
paradigm regarding judges, which views judges as neutral, scientific discov-
ers of legal rules, is outmoded and detracts from the debate regarding the
legitimacy of judicial review.35 Professor Wells suggests a more realistic
view of scientific endeavor that might better inform our understanding of
judicial review.
30. Daniel A. Farber, Did Roe v. Wade Pass the Arbitrary and Capricious Test?,
70 Mo. L. REv. 1231 (2005).
31. Id. at 1232.
32. Lawrence S. Wrightsman & Justin R. La Mort, Why Do Supreme Court Jus-
tices Succeed or Fail? Harry Blackmun as an Example, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1261 (2005).
33. Id. at 1265.
34. Margaret E. McGuinness, The Internationalism of Justice Harry Blackmun,
70 Mo. L. REv. 1289 (2005).
35. Christina E. Wells, Some Reflections on the Symposium: Judging, the Classi-
cal Legal Paradigm, and the Possible Contributions of Science, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1309
(2005).
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